

Message Text

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ORIGIN ACDA-10

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TO AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM, TECH, IAEA

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS OF JUNE BG AGENDA ITEM 9A - SSIR

REFERENCE: VIENNA 4667

1. DELEGATION MAY AGREE TO PUT OFF SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION
THIS ISSUE TO SEPTEMBER SESSION IF CONSENSUS DEVELOPS IN
FAVOR THIS ACTION. IN THIS EVENT, DELEGATION MAY URGE
APPROVAL AT JUNE BOARD OF INTERIM ACTION RECOMMENDED PARA.
5 REFTEL AND, IF OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS, PROVIDE INITIAL US
COMMENTS ON DOC 1842 CONTAINED BELOW, PARTICULARLY PARAS.
2-5.

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2. WE WELCOME THIS FIRST SPECIAL SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION
REPORT (SSIR) AS PROVIDING MUCH NEEDED INFORMATION FOR
UNDERSTANDING AND ASSESSING THE SAFEGUARDS PROGRAM OF THE
AGENCY. IN PARTICULAR WE WELCOME THE KINDS OF INFORMATION
AND EXPLANATIONS CONTAINED IN SECTIONS 4 AND 5. WE WILL
BE EXAMINING THESE SECTIONS AND THE TABULATED INFORMATION
IN THE SEPARATE PAPER AND MAY WISH LATER TO EXPRESS OUR

VIEWS ON THE DETAILED CONTENT.

3. WITH RESPECT TO THE MATERIAL CONTAINED IN SECTION 2.1 OF THE SSIR WE NOTE THAT MOST OF THE CALLED FOR IMPROVEMENTS IN STATES SYSTEMS OF ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL (SSAC) ARE ALREADY CALLED FOR IN INFCIRC/153. THUS, FOR INFCIRC/153 AGREEMENTS THESE ARE ALREADY OBLIGATIONS ACCEPTED BY THE STATES AND THE DIRECTOR GENERAL REQUIRES NO FURTHER BG APPROVAL TO REQUEST FULFILLMENT OF THESE OBLIGATIONS. IN OTHER CASES US FULLY APPROVES AND SUPPORTS HIS ENDEAVORS TO IMPROVE SSAC IN WAYS WHICH WILL BENEFIT AGENCY SAFE-GUARDS. WE WOULD FURTHER URGE ALL STATES TO RESPOND QUICKLY AND AFFIRMATIVELY TO SUCH REQUESTS BY THE DG. WE NOTE, HOWEVER, THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE OR OTHER FEATURES OF SSAC, WHILE FACILITATING AGENCY SAFEGUARDS, DO NOT REDUCE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR INDEPENDENT VERIFICATION BY THE AGENCY.

4. OUR EXAMINATION OF SECTIONS 2.2-2.6 AND SECTION 5 INDICATES THAT THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO IMPROVING SAFEGUARDS EFFECTIVENESS ARE QUITE STRAIGHTFORWARD AND CLEARLY NEEDED. WE, THUS, URGE THE SECRETARIAT TO PRESS FORWARD IN IMPLEMENTING THESE RECOMMENDATIONS NOW. WE WOULD FULLY ENDORSE A REVIEW BY SAGSI OF ANY RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH MIGHT ALTER THE BASIC NATURE OF SAFEGUARDS, BUT THESE REPRESENT VERY FEW OF THE ABOVE RECOMMENDATIONS. WE URGE ALL MEMBER STATES TO CO-OPERATE WITH THE SECRETARIAT IN IMPLEMENTING THESE NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS.

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5. WE FULLY SUPPORT THE SECRETARIAT'S ANNOUNCED INTENTION IN SECTION 2 TO REDUCE ITS DEPENDENCE UPON THE SO-CALLED QUALITATIVE FACTORS AND JUDGMENTS RELATING THERETO. IN OUR VIEW FACTORS SUCH AS THOSE LISTED IN SECTION 1.11 DO NOT PROVIDE A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR ASSESSING WHETHER SAFEGUARDS OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED. CERTAIN OF THESE FACTORS MAY HAVE IMPACT ON THE EFFICIENCY OF AGENCY SAFE-GUARDS, BUT JUDGMENTS ON SUCH FACTORS DO NOT PERMIT OBJECTIVE DETERMINATION OF WHETHER MATERIAL HAS BEEN DIVERTED. ACHIEVEMENT OF THE SAFEGUARDS OBJECTIVES AND TECHNICAL CONCLUSIONS CALLED FOR IN INFCIRC/153, ARTICLE 28 AND 30, RESPECTIVELY, SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY VERIFIED MATERIAL ACCOUNTANCY SUPPLEMENTED BY CONTAINMENT AND SURVEILLANCE.

6. WE SYMPATHIZE WITH THE SECRETARIAT IN THE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN ATTEMPTING TO SAFEGUARD BULK FACILITIES. WE HAVE SERIOUS RESERVATIONS, HOWEVER, WITH THE

SECRETARIAT'S CONCLUSION, AS REFLECTED IN SECTIONS 2.6, 4.2.4 AND 5.3.7, THAT IT IS UNDESIRABLE OR UNNECESSARY TO VERIFY FLOWS OF CERTAIN MATERIALS AND WE BELIEVE THAT SUCH ISSUES SHOULD BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED BY A BODY SUCH AS SAGSI BEFORE ANY DECISIONS ARE MADE TO ALTER THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE AGENCY'S SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM.

7. SECTION 5.4.1, REFERRING TO FACILITIES CONTAINING LESS THAN 25 KG OF CONTAINED URANIUM -235 OR 8 KG OF PLUTONIUM, SEEMS TO IMPLY THAT SAFEGUARDS OBJECTIVES ARE MET AUTOMATICALLY WITHOUT VERIFICATION. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE AGENCY'S SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM OR OBJECTIVES CAN BE BASED ON SO LITERAL A DEFINITION OF SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY AND WE ASSUME THAT IN FACT IT IS NOT.

8. WE FURTHER ENDORSE THE NEED FOR THE AGENCY TO EVALUATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ITS SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM, AS NOTED IN UNCLASSIFIED

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PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE DG'S NOTE. ALL ASPECTS OF EVALUATION OF SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION AND RESULTS ARE CENTRAL TO MAINTAINING AN EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM, AND WE URGE THE DG TO ENSURE THAT ADEQUATE RESOURCES ARE PROVIDED FOR THESE FUNCTIONS.

9. WITH RESPECT TO SECTION 1.14 WE AGREE THAT SOME DIVERSION STRATEGIES ARE LESS PROBABLE THAN OTHERS AND WE AGREE GENERALLY WITH THE APPROACH SUGGESTED BY THE SECRETARIAT REGARDING CONCEALMENT BY SUBSTITUTION. WE DO NOT AGREE, HOWEVER, WITH THE GENERALIZATION THAT THE MORE SOPHISTICATED A DIVERSION STRATEGY THE MORE IMPROBABLE. IN FACT THE OPPOSITE MIGHT WELL BE THE CASE.

10. EXAMINATION OF SECTION 5.1.2(B) (ACTION PLAN REGARDING LWR SPENT FUEL) DOES NOT MAKE CLEAR THE BASIS FOR THE STATEMENT IN SECTION 2.3 THAT NEW REPORTING PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES ARE NEEDED. WE WOULD APPRECIATE CLARIFICATION ON THIS POINT.

11. IN SECTION 3.3 THE STATEMENT IS MADE THAT THE SIGNIFICANT QUANTITIES THAT APPLY TO IRRADIATED FUEL CONTAINING PLUTONIUM ARE BASED ONLY ON URANIUM CONTENT. IN OUR VIEW THE SAFEGUARDS APPROACH FOR IRRADIATED FUEL IN TERMS BOTH OF SIGNIFICANT QUANTITY AND TIMELINESS OF DETECTION SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE PLUTONIUM CONTENT. CHRISTOPHER

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